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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL WARS
GREGORY H. Fox*
Writing in the wake of America's unhappy involvement in
Vietnam, Michael Walzer argued for a broad prohibition on
outside intervention in national civil wars.1 For Walzer, the
American experience in Vietnam epitomized the inability of
outsiders to understand, let alone to resolve, the divisions that
might lead a nation to go to war with itself. To those who prof-
fered humanitarian motives for intervention, Wazer re-
sponded that such efforts are at best futile: outsiders simply
cannot create tolerant democratic cultures in societies unable
or unwilling to do so for themselves. Walzer acknowledged
that a policy of non-intervention might permit some nations to
endure long and brutal struggles between pro- and anti-demo-
cratic forces, rival ethnic groups, or those simply seeking
power. Yet, he regarded such internecine conflict as crucial to
the process of nation-building, and vastly preferable to an or-
der imposed from abroad. "Citizens of a sovereign state,"
Walzer concluded, "have a right, insofar as they are to be co-
erced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another's
hands."2
For many years, Walzer's atomized conception of the in-
ternational community reflected the dominant theory in inter-
national relations. Many scholars expressed a profound skep-
ticism as to the capacity of sovereign states to form a stable
* Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am
indebted to Thomas M. Franck for his insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. All views expressed are my own.
1. MICRAEL VALzERJuST AND UNJUST ,VARs 86-108 (2d ed. 1992) [here-
inafter WALzJusr mA UNjus ARs]. This edition of the book is virtually
unchanged from the first edition, published in 1977. For an elaboration of
Walzer's views on non-intervention, see Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing
of States: A Reply to Four Critics, in INmnRNA'rotAL ETHics 217 (Charles R. Beitz
et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter Walzer, The Moral Standing of States].
2. WALzER, JusT AND UNjusr WARs, supra note 1, at 86.
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political community based on shared mutual interests.3 In
their view, divisions of various kinds-first and foremost those
of nationality, but also divisions of culture, values, military
might, productive capacity, and historical experience-consti-
tuted the defining features of international society. Civil wars
epitomize the type of issue that, in their view, the international
community was ill-equipped to address. Such conflicts in-
volved questions that rarely transcended these points of divi-
sion, and indeed, by their very insularity, boldly highlighted
the estrangement of different international constituencies
from one another.
Much has changed since Walzer first made these argu-
ments in 1977. Only history can judge the ultimate validity of
his position as an empirical theory of social evolution. But in
1994 the international community has rather decidedly re-
jected the normative prescription arising from Walzer's statist
worldview-a rule prohibiting intervention in civil wars except
in a few extreme cases. Operating primarily through the or-
gans of the United Nations, states have shown a heightened
and even aggressive interest in resolving not only civil wars, but
also the many attendant human crises they spawn. In so do-
ing, states have begun to develop new international norms
designed to place the actions of the United Nations and others
in these conflicts on a firm legal footing.
II
Before examining these new norms, it is important to
note that two broad challenges to the assumptions underlying
Walzer's principle of non-intervention are implicit in this pro-
cess of legal innovation. The first directly confronts Walzer's
view that outsiders cannot, in any meaningful fashion, assist
the development of democratic civil societies in states torn by
internal conflict. In contrast to ad hoc unilateral interventions
such as Vietnam, which apparently provoked Walzer's enmity,
the international community has manifested an increasing
confidence in the capacity of international organizations to
mediate an end to civil conflicts and to manage, at least in
some rudimentary way, the most egregious consequences of
3. See the discussion by Steven Forde, Classical Realism, and Jack Don-
nelly, Twentieth-Centur Realism, in TRADMONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 62-
111 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
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protracted civil war. Beginning in the late 1980s, the United
Nations played an integral part in agreements ending internal
conflicts in Angola,4 Cambodia,5 El Salvador,8 Liberia,7
Mozambique," Namibia9 and the Western Sahara.10 While the
United Nations was not a party to the negotiated end to
Apartheid in South Africa, the years of U.N.-directed pressure
against the white minority regime clearly influenced its deci-
sion to cede power through majority-rule elections. Missions
dispatched with the goal of securing accords to avoid or to end
civil wars are currently underway in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan,
Burundi, East Timor, Georgia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and
Zaire."
The need for third party mediation in the above men-
tioned conflicts was clear- the parties were acutely mistrustful
of each other's motives and had little faith in the viability of
comprehensive peace plans negotiated solely amongst them-
selves. At the same time, many potentially influential nations
were effectively disqualified from serving as mediators by lin-
4. S.C. Res. 696, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 37, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/47 (1991); S.C. Res. 747, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 84,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
5. FrnAL Aar OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, U.N. Doc. A/46/
608 & S/23177 (Annex) (1991); S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. &
Dec., at 39, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
6. The civil war in El Salvador was ended by a series of agreements ne-
gotiated between April 1990 and January 1992. See United Nations Depart-
ment of Public Information, EL SALVADOR AGREEMFNTS: THE PATH TO PEACE,
U.N. ST/DPI/1208 (1992); S.C. Res. 693, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. &
Dec., at 33, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991).
7. CONTONou AGREEMET, U.N. Doc. S/26272 (Annex) (1993); S.C.
Res. 813, U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (Mar. 26, 1993); S.C. Res. 856, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/856 (Aug. 10, 1993).
8. GENERAL PEACE AGR.EiNT, U.N. Doc. S/24635 (Annex) (1992); S.C.
Res. 797, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 103, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992).
9. Tripartite Agreements on Southwest Africa: Blueprint for Peace and
Namibian Independence, 28 I.LM. 944 (1989); S.C. Res. 628, U.N. SCOR,
44th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/45 (1989); S.C. Res. 629, U.N.
SCOR, 44th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/45 (1989).
10. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/21360 (1990); S.C.
Res. 690, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 35, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47
(1991).
11. See the description of these missions in the Report of the Secretad-Gen-
eralon the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 58-
80, U.N. Doc. A/49/1 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Sreary)-General].
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gering memories of colonial rule over some states and of su-
perpower proxy wars conducted in others.
International organizations, however, carried little such
hegemonic baggage. The United Nations brought to these
missions a forty-year history of relative success in maintaining
neutrality during peacekeeping missions,12 as well as the medi-
ation services offered by the Secretary-General in exercising
his good offices function.13 In playing the role of broker, the
United Nations and certain regional organizations provided a
forum for discussion where none previously existed.
The often successful compromises achieved by the United
Nations suggest that the services it offers do not interfere with
"indigenous" choices of the parties involved. Rather, it
presents combatants with a broader range of options for
resolving their differences than would exist without the pres-
ence of a neutral third party. Additionally, it provides re-
sources essential to wind down protracted and destructive con-
flict. Walzer's contention that outside intervention in civil
wars interrupts an organic process of national self-definition
appears to have little relevance to U.N. practice in mediating
disputes, monitoring elections, and dispatching peacekeeping
troops to oversee crucial periods of demilitarization.
The second challenge to Walzer comes from an emerging
consensus on humanitarian values that may be seen as temper-
ing the worst excesses of civil conflicts. Walzer's argument as-
sumes that when external actors become involved in civil wars
they necessarily seek to resolve the conflicts themselves, and
thus must make questionable judgments regarding the warring
parties' entitlement to govern. Yet the broad body of human
rights law consists of norms that effectively divorce the means
of prosecuting civil conflicts from their ends. The conduct of
many civil wars raises a host of human rights issues: govern-
ment troops deliberately target civilians; "death squads" and
other quasi-official groups seek to silence those sympathetic to
rebels; ethnic kinsmen of rebels are singled out for persecu-
12. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institu-
tional System, 240 RECUEIL DES CouRs 292-97 (1993).
13. See Thomas M. Franck & Georg Nolte, The Good Offices Function of the
UN Secretary-Generai in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE U.N.'s ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds.,
2d ed. 1993).
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tion; and states of emergency are declared during which civil
liberties are suspended, elections are postponed, and persons
are detained without charge or trial. In Walzer's view, these
are instruments by which states seek to define their national
identities and not merely side-effects of the process of national
self-definition. He argues that the international community's
first priority must be to leave both the ends and means in this
process to the people of a state.
Many challenged Walzer's argument as unduly callous
when he first published his book.14 This challenge is even
more persuasive today. Increasingly, we no longer witness
traditional wars fought against soldiers, but genocidal wars
against entire civilian populations.' 5 Perhaps responding to
this phenomenon of "total" civil war, international bodies now
routinely address human rights abuses that arise during inter-
nal conflicts. More than two-thirds of U.N. member states are
treaty-bound to accord their own citizens a broad range of
human rights,' 6 and a core of essential rights is immune from
wartime suspension.17 The U.N. Security Council regularly
condemns the excesses of one or both sides engaged in civil
wars.18 The conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rvanda have been
fought with such ruthlessness that the Security Council has es-
tablished international tribunals to prosecute violators of ap-
plicable international norms.1 9
14. See, e.g., David Lubban, The Romance of the Nation-Sta4(4 in INTERNA.
TIoNAL ETmIcs, supra note 1, at 238-39.
15. See, for example, the descriptions of conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan in AmNEmST IL, 1994 REPoRT 76-79, 196-
98, 215-17, 272-75 (1994).
16. As ofJuly 30, 1993, there were 122 states party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the most widely subscribed general
human rights treaty. Report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993).
17. See, ag., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171;JAmE ORAA, STATES OF tEMRCENC" IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1992).
18. In the case of Liberia, for example, the Council called on all parties
"to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law." S.C.
Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 99, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992).
19. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (Yugoslavia);
S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994) (Rvanda).
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Walzer's elevation of national borders to sharp fault-lines,
defining differing levels of legal protection for basic human
rights, stemmed from his belief that rights originate and be-
come meaningful only in specific political communities. 20
The universalism evident in these new norms and institutions,
however, suggests that states are not willing to wait for all com-
munities to evolve toward an acceptable level of protection.
All persons are entitled to rights of dignity and autonomy, no
matter how chaotic or mendacious their countries' political in-
stitutions may be.
III
While human rights law has begun to scrutinize aspects of
the prosecution of civil wars, its norms have not been devel-
oped to address the conflicts as such. Direct intervention into
civil wars implicates two other areas of international law. The
first is the U.N. Security Council's collective security appara-
tus. The second is unilateral intervention in domestic con-
flicts.
In the first area, the U.N. Security Council has broadened
its own jurisdiction to include civil conflicts within the ambit of
the Charter's collective security system. The most striking fea-
ture of this development for international lawyers is that the
formal requirements for initiating collective action have not
changed. Where, as in the case of a civil war, the Council is
not confronted by aggressive acts of one state against another,
Chapter VII of the Charter requires that in order for the U.N.
to respond with force the conduct in question must constitute
a "threat to the peace."21 The drafters of the Charter clearly
did not intend this phrase to encompass internal conflicts.
Nor, as a strictly grammatical matter, is it easily interpreted as
doing so. The drafters' paradigm for acts constituting a
"threat to the peace" was a Nazi-like regime preparing for a
cross-border invasion. The "peace" potentially threatened, in
other words, was international and not domestic.
20. Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, supra note 1, at 234-35.
21. U.N. CHa-ER art. 39. Article 39 of the Charter contains the jurisdic-
tional trigger for the Security Council's Chapter VII authority. It requires
that before that authority is invoked the Council must find a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or [an] act of aggression." Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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The Security Council first explicitly crossed this interpre-
tive threshold well before the end of the Cold War when, in
1966 and 1977, respectively, it deemed Apartheid regimes in
Southern Rhodesia 22 and South Africa2 3 to be threats to the
peace.2 4 But, while the resolutions addressing both these situ-
ations questioned the legitimacy of a group's hold on political
power, neither involved a battlefield civil war. Moreover, the
anti-Apartheid movement provided a unique rallying point for
many of the countries instrumental in galvanizing support for
U.N. involvement. When later faced with civil conflicts in their
own regions which lacked a racial component, many of these
same states were noticeably silent on the question of multilat-
eral intervention.25
It took the waning of the veto threat at the end of the
Cold War to create an atmosphere in which civil wars could be
treated as indigenous conflicts with arguable international im-
plications, rather than local manifestations of a global struggle
between the superpowers. The Council's condemnation of
the Iraqi treatment of its Kurdish minority was the first such
case.2 6 It was followed in the ensuing two years by resolutions
22. S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., Res. & Dec., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/21/Rev.1 (1966); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., Res. & Dec., at 7,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966).
23. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., Res. & Dec., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/33 (1977).
24. The U.N. experience in the Congo, including its forcible halt of the
attempted secession by the province of Katanga, wvas the first arguable inter-
nationalization of a civil war. Yet the precedential value of the Congo epi-
sode is unclear, both because the initial deployment of U.N. troops came in
response to the presence of Belgian paratroopers and because, while the
Council's resolutions authorized the use of force, they did not explicitly in-
voke Chapter VII of the Charter. S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Res.
& Dec. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/16/Rev.1 (1961); S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR.
16th Sess., Res. & Dec. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/16/Rev.1 (1961). Perhaps
more importantly, the Congo mission precipitated a financial and constitu-
tional crisis in the U.N. which has continued to tarnish the mission's mem-
ory. See Sally Morphet, U.N. Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring, in UNrr
NATIONS, DrvmED WoRLD: THE U.N.'s ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RraA11O,.Ns,
supra note 13, at 183, 198-99.
25. For example, when the Ibo region of Nigeria attempted to establish
independence as Biafra in 1967-1970, only four states officially extended rec-
ognition. HEATHER WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MovFh-NTs 85-87 (1988).
26. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 31, U.N. Do. S/
INF/47 (1991).
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finding conflicts in Angola, 27 the former Yugoslavia,28 Libe-
ria,29 and Somalia"0 to constitute "threats to the peace." The
Security Council deemed the Haitian military coup and its at-
tendant consequences a threat to the peace on June 16, 1993,
although, like Apartheid, it did not involve open warfare. 3'
One commentator has aptly noted that the Council's ju-
risprudence on this subject is an area "where recent interna-
tional practice has most clearly run ahead of principle."32
Neither the Council nor the General Assembly has attempted
to devise a coherent set of principles that would explain the
international community's interest in these conflicts. As a re-
sult, each of these resolutions, in deeming essentially domestic
conflicts to be threats to international peace, involves a none-
too-subtle linguistic sleight of hand. In essence, the Council
reads the words of Chapter VII to mean something they clearly
do not: conflicts with few cross-border effects are deemed
threats to other states or to the international community at
large. In straying so far from the clear meaning of the Charter
text, these resolutions call into question the usefulness of the
document's specific language as an effective limitation on Se-
curity Council jurisdiction. Words capable of being inter-
preted to mean anything may effectively mean nothing. Word-
ing in several resolutions stating, as in the case of Somalia, that
the conflict in question is "unique" and of a "deteriorating,
complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate
and exceptional response"33 magnifies the problem. This
wording is an evident attempt to deprive the resolutions of any
27. S.C. Res. 864, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993).
28. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 42, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/47 (1991); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 13,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
29. S.C. Res. 788, supra note 18.
30. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 55, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/48 (1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 63,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
31. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993).
32. NIGEL GOULD-DAVIES, THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER: THE STATE OF
DELIBERATIONS 25 (1993).
33. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 30. Similarly, in imposing an embargo on
Haiti, the Council described the events constituting a threat to the peace as
"unique and exceptional circumstances." S.C. Res. 841, supra note 31.
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precedential value that might support a generalized right to
intervene in some or all civil wars. sm
Given this lack of a coherent jurisprudence, should one
conclude that the Council's involvement in civil wars lacks an
essential legitimacy? One might argue that the problems asso-
ciated with questionable Charter interpretations are over-
stated, since the Council's prestige is much more likely to de-
pend on the ultimate success or failure of a mission, than on
its origins in an arguably ultra vires resolution. But interna-
tional law cannot afford to have questions of institutional legit-
imacy turn on often inaccurate perceptions of the U.N.'s ca-
pacity to manage large-scale operations.3 5 A more direct de-
fense of the resolutions' legality is needed. Two primary
arguments can be put forward.
The first is that the U.N. Charter, unlike most national
constitutions, generally operates in settings in which political
and not legal restraints define the limits of permissible action.
The International Court ofJustice (the Court) does not prac-
tice active judicial review of Security Council actions, despite
hints that it may have the power to do so. 36 Rather, the Court
has accepted the right of political organs to interpret the
Charter creatively through long-standing and unchallenged
practice.3 7
34. This attempt will almost surely fail. If the Security Council is willing
to engage in loose interpretations of the Charter itself, there is little reason
to believe it will feel itself constrained by language in mere resolutions.
35. The Somalia mission, for example, was widely reported to be a failure
of U.N. command, resolve, and planning. American politicians repeated
this charge in broad attacks on U.S. participation in collective security and
peacekeeping operations. However, the event which precipitated the
charges of failure-the attempted capture of General Mohammed Aidid in
October 1993 during which 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed-as a U.S.
operation from inception to execution. U.N. officials were informed of the
raid only hours before it began and were given no opportunity to alter or
cancel it. Michael R. Gordon & Thomas L Friedman, Details of U.S. Raid in
Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep, N.Y. Tnhs, Oc L 25, 1993, at Al, Al0.
36. Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v.
U.S.), 1992 I.CJ. 114, 126-27 (Provisional Measures) [hereinafter "Lock-
erbie Case"]; Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Uili-
mate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 Am.J. INTL L 519 (1992).
37. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, South Africa objected that several
permanent members of the Security Council had abstained from voting on
crucial resolutions at issue in the case. It contended that those resolutions
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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More fundamentally, theories developed in support ofju-
dicial review in national legal systems do not translate easily to
the U.N. system. One common justification for judicial review
of acts by political majorities is the protection of citizens' basic
rights.38 But apart from norms ofjus cogens, states lack a set of
fundamental rights under general international law similar to
those found in national constitutions. The sphere of a state's
exclusive domestic jurisdiction is not immutable"9 and has pro-
gressively receded as the corpus of international law has ex-
panded. Treaty-based rights of states must yield to U.N. Char-
ter obligations, including the obligation to obey Security
Council resolutions.40
A second justification for judicial review is that it serves to
remedy exclusions from the majoritarian process.41 On this
view, the courts give voice to those groups or individuals who,
because of legal impediments to full participation, cannot ef-
fectively protect their interests through normal lawmaking
processes. Yet, even proponents of this process-enhancing the-
ory acknowledge that its force wanes and eventually disappears
once discriminatory barriers to political participation have
been removed. 42 This theory does not purport to remedy im-
were thereby invalid under Article 27(3) of the Charter, which requires the
"concurring votes of the permanent members." U.N. CHARTIm art. 27, para.
3. The Court responded that in practice the Council's members had "con-
sistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a
permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions."
This practice, the Court held, "has been generally accepted by Members of
the United Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization."
The Court accepted this practice as modifying "concurring" to include "ab-
staining." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 4, 10 (June 21) (Advisory Opin-
ion).
38. See, e.g., RONALD DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-49 (1977).
39. Tunis & Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.LJ. (ser. B) No. 4
(Feb. 27) (Advisory Opinion) ("[t]he question of whether a certain matter is
or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative ques-
tion; it depends on the development of international relations.").
40. Article 103 of the Charter provides that "[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHAR.
rER art. 103; see Lockerbie Case, supra note 36, at 126.
41. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT (1980).
42. Id. at 169-70.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 26:633
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL WRS
balances in political power or to compensate for certain immu-
table characteristics (such as race, gender, or ethnicity) that,
even absent overt prejudice, may make it difficult for a group
to build political coalitions and to translate its interests into
law. In the international system, explanations for why many
states are unable to influence Security Council resolutions
generally involve issues of this type-disparities in political,
military, and economic power-rather than formal barriers to
participation in Council decision-making. 43 Indeed, no reso-
lution can pass the Security Council without the affirmative
votes of four non-permanent members, each of whom is
elected as the representative of a different voting group. 44
In the absence ofjudicial review, the Security Council has
steadily expanded the scope of its Chapter VII jurisdiction. A
burgeoning repertoire of practice now finds various aspects of
civil wars to present a "threat to the peace." Some might ob-
ject that the overwhelming influence of the permanent five
makes these resolutions rather unhelpful in assessing whether
the majority of U.N. member states concur in the Council's
reading of the Charter. But as Paul Szasz has pointed out
Council members are acutely aware that undertaking large or
risky operations without a broad base of support among the
membership is simply pointless: missions involving embar-
goes, troop commitments, or other cooperative ventures can-
not succeed without the active involvement of a large number
of countries.4 Such a sense of prudence is evident in the reso-
43. The most obvious formal barrier to non-permanent members impos-
ing limits on arguably illegitimate Security Council actions is their lack of a
veto power. But a state's capacity to influence Council actions is closely tied
to its international standing more generally, a status which may or may not
coincide with possession of the veto power. Economically powerful non-per-
manent members such as Japan and Germany are regularly consulted on
important Council actions, while France and Britain, despite having the
power to veto resolutions contrary to their interests, have rarely done so
without the United States as a voting partner. As David Caron points out,
proposals to expand the Council's permanent membership "would not affect
the power of the West in international affairs generally, and would only mar-
ginally diminish the capabilities of the West in the Council." David D.
Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the SeCuriy Council 87 Mt. J.
INTL L. 552, 576 (1993).
44. In order for a resolution to pass the Council, nine of its fifteen mem-
bers must vote affirmatively. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 1.
45. Paul C. Szasz, Centralized and Decentralized Law Enforcement: the
Security Council and the General Assembly Acting under Chapters VII and
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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lutions concerning civil wars. The General Assembly, acting by
consensus, has consistently affirmed the Council's decisions
regarding the conflicts in Iraqi Kurdistan, 46 Liberia,47
Somalia,48 Haiti, 49 and the former Yugoslavia. 50 At least in
these cases, the Council apparently has not engaged in inter-
pretive adventures unsupported by most other member states.
The second reason to regard the Council's actions on civil
wars as legitimate is that to demand more-either a coherent
theory justifying its actions in all cases or a Charter amend-
ment formalizing their legality-is simply to ask too much of a
fragile organization. The U.N.'s response to civil wars has in-
volved extrapolations from the Charter's scheme for address-
ing inter-state conflict. That mechanism is itself of recent vin-
tage and highly underdeveloped. The use of force by states
became illegal for the entire international community only
upon the signing of the Charter in 1945. 51 The General As-
sembly took until 1974 to agree on a definition of state "ag-
gression."5 2 And the first decision of the Court to discuss the
dominant form of interstate conflict in the Charter era-
proxy warfare through armed insurgencies-came only in
VIII, Paper Presented to the International Symposium on Allocation of Law
Enforcement Authority in the International System (Kiel, Germany, Mar. 23-
25, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
46. G.A. Res. 145, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 221, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
47. G.A. Res. 154, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 114, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
48. G.A. Res. 160, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 118, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
49. G.A- Res. 27, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/48/49 (1993).
50. G.A. Res. 147, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 223, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
51. War was considered a legitimate tool of statecraft in the Nineteenth
century, limited in its conduct but not in its initiation. See LASSA OPPENMIEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 56 (1906) ("war is not inconsistent with, but a condition
regulated by International Law.") The League of Nations Covenant pro-
vided for conciliation procedures and automatic sanctions in the event of
aggression, but did not outlaw aggressive acts themselves. LEAGUE or NA.
TIONS CovENANT arts. 12, 13, 15. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which was
the first agreement to prohibit warfare "as an instrument of national policy,"
applied only to parties to the Pact. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy, art. II, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928).
52. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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1986.53 Moreover, the essential tools of the collective security
system as outlined in the Charter-agreements between mem-
ber states and the United Nations to supply troops upon the
Security Council's call-have never been negotiated. A legal
system only recently secure in its fundamental principles and
having never used its only prescribed mechanism of enforce-
ment is ill-suited for a complete reconceptualization on ex-
tremely short notice.
IV
The second area of international law whose evolution ar-
guably has affected the traditional status of civil wars is unilat-
eral intervention. Given the Security Council's evident willing-
ness to grant approval to military actions that are unilateral in
all but name,54 this area of the law may become less controver-
sial. But it is by no means certain that the unity of purpose
among the Council's permanent members-so necessary to
approve such delegations of authority to individual states or
coalitions-will last far into the future. Even where consensus
on a particular operation is assured, there are those (especially
in the United States) who seek to avoid any sort of multilateral
control over their national militaries. Moreover, some states
may seek the Council's approval for intervention only after
they have commenced (or even completed) an action, leaving
the initial incursion to be judged by rules concerning purely
unilateral acts.55 The norms governing unilateralism, there-
fore, continue to warrant scrutiny.
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (Merits).
54. The Council has on three occasions authorized individual states to
use "all necessary means" to eliminate an identified threat to the peace. S.C.
Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990) (Iraq-Kuwait); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Res. & Dec., at
63, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
940 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti).
55. The case of Liberia, while involving a regional organization and not
an individual state, suggests a possible model in this regard. A force organ-
ized by the Economic Community of West African States intervened in the
Liberian civil war on August 25, 1990, pursuant to a resolution issued by its
Standing Mediation Committee on August 10. See Georg Nolte, International
Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflic, 53 ZErscHRTrT FOR AusLkNDtsCHES OmEN-
TucH-s R~ci-rr UND V6uucirr 603 (1993). However, the intervention
was not taken up by the Security Council untilJanuary 1991, when the Presi-
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The International Court in the Nicaragua case restated the
traditional position of international law on unilateral interven-
tion in civil wars. Where a government requests intervention,
other states may provide assistance. However, when an opposi-
tion group requests intervention, states may not respond.56 The
Court's opinion makes no mention of qualitative limitations
on the right of incumbent governments to seek assistance such
as might, for example, be motivated by a regime's human
rights record. Similarly, the Court held that aid to an opposi-
tion group does not become legal even if it is designed to re-
move a government that abuses the rights of its citizens.5 7
These rules have a long pedigree. In the aftermath of the
1815 Congress of Vienna, three conservative European states
joined together to form the Holy Alliance (The Alliance) in an
effort to suppress popular revolt against monarchical rule.5 8
The Alliance's 1820 Declaration of Principles is worth quoting
at length:
Any state forming part of the European Alliance
which may change its form of interior government
through revolutionary means, and which might thus
become a menace to other states, will automatically
cease to form a part of the Alliance, and will remain
excluded from its councils until its situation gives
every guarantee of order and stability.
The Allied Powers not only formally declare the
above to be their unalterable policy, but faithful to
the principles which they have proclaimed concern-
ing the authority of legitimate governments, they fur-
ther agree to refuse to recognize any changes
brought about by other than legal means. In the case
of states where such changes have already taken place
and such action has thereby given cause for appre-
hension to neighboring states (it lies within the abil-
ity of the powers to take such useful and beneficent
dent of the Council issued a note approving of the action. U.N. Doc. S/
22133 (Jan. 22, 1991). The first Council resolution on the Liberian situation
was not passed until November 1992. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
Res. & Dec., at 99, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 53, at 126.
57. Id. at 120-24.
58. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
188 (rev. ed. 1954).
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action) they will employ every means to bring the of-
fenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance.
Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted
to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed, should
this be necessary.59
While the Alliance was short-lived, the legacy of its reac-
tionary internationalism left a palpable distaste in many states
against norms that might permit unilateral policing of specific
notions of governmental legitimacy. In fairly short order, in-
ternational law came to hold that any regime in effective con-
trol of a state was entitled to be regarded as its legitimate gov-
ernment.60 This rule began as a norm of recognition, but as
international law developed increasingly explicit prohibitions
against the unilateral use of force, it became a powerful re-
sponse to attempts to justify intervention. The Court's rejec-
tion of the U.S. argument that in supporting the contra rebels
it sought to defend the human rights of Nicaraguan citizens
would seem to follow logically from this historical experience.
But does it? Increasingly, those who support a right of
unilateral intervention against incumbent governments base
their claims on universalist principles of human rights, such as
those at issue in Nicaragua.61 They argue that governmental
legitimacy stems not from effective control over territory but
from due regard for the interests of the governed. Thus, a
regime engaging in persistent human rights violations, by defi-
nition, forfeits an entitlement to be regarded as legitimate.
The linchpin of this claim is the ubiquity of human rights
norms, both in treaty62 and customary international law.6
Their general acceptance addresses the central problem posed
by hegemonic intervenors such as the Holy Alliance: the lack
59. Quoted in W.P. CRESSON, THE HOLY ALLIANcE; THE EUROPFAN BACK-
GROUND OF THE MONROE DocTRNE 99 n.2 (1922).
60. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 92-93 (4th
ed. 1990).
61. See, eg., FERNANDo TES6N, HUMANrrARLAN INTERVEION: AN IbqUIRY
-r-o LAW AND MoRAn, 111-23 (1988); W. Michael Reisman, Soverdgnly and
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.J. INT'L L 866 (1990).
62. The state of ratification of the major global human rights treaties is
discussed in the Report of the Secretai,-Genera4 supra note 11, at 51-52.
63. Barcelona Traction, light and Power Company (Beig. v. Spain), 1970
I.CJ. 3, 33 (Feb. 5); Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HubtA RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 118 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
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of agreement on the principles to be served by such actions.
These norms, it is argued, allow principled distinctions to be
drawn between legitimate and illegitimate regimes, and thus
may serve to guide states in deciding whether or not to inter-
vene in civil wars and on whose behalf.
Proponents of this view may find support in several cases
where the international community has made judgments of a
regime's entitlement to govern. While these examples do not
involve actual authorization for unilateral intervention, they
could be claimed as persuasive grounds upon which a decision
to intervene might be based.6 In 1976, the General Assembly,
after declaring the African National Congress and the Pan Af-
rican Congress to be "the authentic representatives of the
overwhelming majority of the South African people," appealed
to all member states and organizations "to provide all assist-
ance required by the oppressed people of South Africa and
their national liberation movements during their legitimate
struggle." 65 General Assembly resolutions on Haiti66 and My-
anmar 67 also made judgments of regimes' entitlement to rule.
In these admittedly limited instances, international law
has begun to engage in qualitative assessments of both govern-
ments and rebel groups, setting aside the traditional rule
strictly favoring incumbent regimes. Proponents of unilateral-
ism would claim that given the contemporary omnipresence of
human rights values, this change is hardly surprising. The
traditional rule is a profoundly conservative doctrine that func-
tions to entrench, without distinction, democracies, theocra-
cies, monarchies, military juntas and one-party dictatorships
alike. It favors the status quo regardless of the abuse a govern-
ment may impose upon its citizens. In many other contexts,
64. One could well object to the use of these examples that they are not
unilateral actions at all, since they each involve the vote of a multilateral
body, albeit one without the power to bind its members. Nevertheless, they
constitute authorization of some kind. As I will argue below, it is the lack of
a neutral adjudicator that ultimately undermines the goals of even well-in-
tentioned proponents of unilateral intervention. See discussion infra part III.
65. G.A. Res. 31/6(I), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 14, U.N.
Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
66. G.A. Res. 27, supra note 49, at 67.
67. GA. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 271, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (urging the government of Myanmar to effect a "trans-
fer of power to the democratically elected representatives" chosen in the
1990 elections).
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international law takes a clear position on the permissibility of
such acts and, increasingly, on the legitimacy of certain re-
gimes themselves.6 Where the equities in a civil war are clear,
should international law not do so on the question of third-
party intervention as well?
The formulation of this question suggests an answer. Easy
cases are, of course, uncontroversial; few would condemn
third-party assistance to those, say, resisting Khmer Rouge ge-
nocide in Cambodia during the 1970s. The difficulty is that
the equities are often not so clear: the human rights records of
both rebel groups and incumbent governments are frequently
mixed, thereby rendering the ultimate value of assistance to
either side uncertain. Perhaps more importantly, states often
make claims concerning humanitarian intervention that are
patently untrue. In the case of such ambiguous or outright
dishonest claims of entitlement to intervene, an evident con-
sensus on principles is of little practical use in assessing the
legitimacy of a particular intervention. Principles, however
commendable in substance, are not self-implementing. When
intervening states serve as judges in their own cases, inevitably
each will claim that its acts conform to relevant international
norms. In the absence of a neutral third-party adjudicator,
charged with judging the validity of such claims in some man-
ner that approaches objectivity, the legitimacy of unilateral in-
tervention will have been asserted but never demonstrated.
Superpower interventions in Czechoslovakia, the Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, and Panama, among
others, bear historical witness to this fact. Thus, there is little
assurance that human rights norms will be well-served by uni-
lateral intervention unconstrained by any institutionalized pro-
cess of review. To the contrary, unilateralism may actually di-
minish the hard-won legitimacy human rights law has only re-
cently achieved. During the Cold War, when unilateral
intervention was rampant, claims of rights violations were in-
voked in such blatant service of political ends that the rights
themselves became debased, often functioning as little more
than window dressing. There is a danger of regression to this
68. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democradas 36 HALv.
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1995); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Partidpa-
tion in Internationai Law, 17 YAI.EJ. INT'L L 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 A. J. INT'L L 46 (1992).
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era of empty rhetoric if the international community does not
continue to support institutions that evaluate claims of norma-
tive entitlement to act. Dishonest application of norms so in-
fused with idealism will produce a cynicism about their utility
that will be difficult to reverse.
Legal structures do exist to address this problem. The
U.N. Charter prohibits pure unilateral intervention and re-
quires that the Security Council evaluate and approve any use
of force in advance. 69 A legitimate use of force, in other
words, must be the product of collective deliberations. Of
course the Security Council has its own problems of legiti-
macy.70 Moreover, even missions approved according to Char-
ter procedures, as in the case of Somalia, may be unable to
secure long-term stability in target states. But it is of critical
importance that these issues be separated from the founda-
tional question of right authority: whether intervention in civil
wars must, in all cases, be approved by an international body.
If human rights advocates answer this question in the negative,
on the arguable theory that unilateral intervention can be ac-
complished more quickly and efficiently, they must be pre-
pared to answer difficult questions about a mission's legiti-
macy once the inevitable problems occur. Walzer was certainly
correct that civil wars involve intensely local problems which
outsiders may be unable to address decisively. It is precisely,
however, because this is true that the initial decision to inter-
vene must be beyond reproach. If both the legitimacy of an
intervention and the methods used to resolve protracted con-
flict come under attack, the future of such missions will be
bleak.
The need for innovative thinking by international lawyers
does not end with the decision that some institutional umpir-
ing mechanism is needed. Civil wars present conflicting incen-
tives to third parties that may work directly against the estab-
lishment of procedural controls. On the one hand, various
forms of global interdependence have all but ended the isola-
tion of civil wars from world public consciousness. Responsi-
ble factors include the omnipresence of media coverage (CNN
as the Security Council's "Sixth Permanent Member"); the
likelihood that in any given country in which a civil war com-
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 & arts. 39-42.
70. See generally Caron, supra note 43.
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mences the United Nations will already have some sort of pres-
ence-humanitarian relief, refugee assistance, development
projects-which may plant the seeds for possible escalation;
the virtual elimination of the nuclear tripwire as a barrier to
large power involvement in developing countries' internal
conflicts; and, as we have noted, a heightened concern for
human rights violations, wherever they occur. These factors
combine to make it quite difficult for the international com-
munity to ignore protracted and/or brutal civil conflicts for
any length of time.
On the other hand, each state continues to have an over-
whelming interest in maintaining maximum flexibility should
it be faced with an insurrectionist or separatist movement of its
own. Of course, the degree to which any state may imagine
itself involved in a civil war varies considerably. But, even
states that enjoy relative domestic stability may have important
allies who do not. The United States, with little prospect of
facing a civil war itself, has failed to ratify Protocol H to the
Geneva Conventions, which would extend certain legal protec-
tions to civilians and combatants involved in or affected by
large-scale civil wars. The United States is not alone in this
decision. In contrast to the 185 states that have ratified the
four main Geneva Conventions, Protocol II has attracted only
122 state parties. 71 Like the members of the Holy Alliance, it
is an established, stable power with interests that are generally
served by continued stability elsewhere. Its interests are not
well-served by a principle of general application allowing (or
perhaps even requiring) multilateral intervention against cer-
tain incumbent regimes.
The logical accommodation of these two conflicting ten-
dencies is the approach in fact taken by the Security Council:
to take jurisdiction over a conflict when inaction becomes po-
litically or morally intolerable, but to make clear that each case
stands on its own terms and does not establish a general plan
of action. As a psychological matter, each such foray obviously
makes the next case appear as less of a watershed. But it is
71. The figure for the main Geneva Conventions is as of December 31,
1993. 298 Ir'L R. RED CROSS 70 (1994). The figure for Protocol I1 is as of
April 8, 1994. 300 INT'L R. RED CROSS 298 (1994). For views on the contro-
versy surrounding Protocol H, see A Discussion of Protocol H to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, 82 A.S.I.L PRoc. 613 (1988).
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equally clear that members of the Security Council take the
legal implications of their votes favoring intervention quite se-
riously. The Security Council does reserve the option to de-
cide in the case of particularly intractable conflicts that the
international community's collective interests are not impli-
cated.
V
The involvement of international law in civil wars repre-
sents the culmination of an immense shift in normative focus
that began with the human rights movement. Traditional in-
ternational law had little, if anything, to say about the relations
between governments and their citizens. Human rights law
pierced this domestic veil by addressing certain acts by states
against their people-for example, torture-which the inter-
national community deemed unacceptable. In order to
achieve compliance with such human rights norms, states must
cease the prohibited acts. The law began to change again at
the end of the Cold War when the international community
became active in encouraging transitions to democratic gov-
ernment. This new focus moved from condemning discrete
acts to challenging entire regimes. In order to achieve compli-
ance with a norm of democratic governance, a regime may not
merely alter objectionable policies, but must put in place an
electoral process that holds the very real potential of leading
to that regime's own removal from power.
Norms and institutions concerned with civil wars involve a
still more substantial intrusion into the domestic sphere. As
we have noted, the traditional international law described in
the Nicaragua case unequivocally favors incumbent govern-
ments. Any modification of this rule necessarily functions to
assist those opposing such regimes. Allowing direct assistance
to rebellious groups is only the most obvious erosion of an in-
cumbent's advantage. Even U.N. negotiation of a cease-fire
upon a rebel group's request functions as a form of assistance,
since rebels would only seek to halt a conflict they anticipate
losing. An opposition confident in its ability to defeat a gov-
ernment militarily has no reason to seek accommodation short
of total victory. Similarly, the enforcement of human rights
norms in the midst of a civil conflict deprives a government of
techniques of warfare that it perceives-perhaps because of
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their very brutality-as effective means of combatting rebel
forces.72 Creating a space for law in the otherwise unregulated
sphere of civil conflict thus moves far beyond the mere poten-
tial for electoral defeat embodied in a right to democratic gov-
ernance. It seeks to have governments recognize legal entitle-
ments for those whom the law of every state would surely pros-
ecute for treason. Many, including the United States, punish
such acts by death.
Given this dynamic, the growing involvement of interna-
tional law in civil wars is, to say the least, remarkable. Yet, the
reasons why governments have begun to support the interposi-
don /of legal controls are apparent in the conflicts them-
selves. Many of the conflicts have dragged on for years and the
participants have become weary of fighting. Other conflicts
have become the focus of international pressure because of
their particular brutality. Still others were, in many respects,
the products of broader regional or global conflicts and be-
came ripe for resolution once the "parent" struggles were re-
solved. The evolution of international law has, for the most
part, consisted of the repertoire of practices developed in the
community's collective response to individual crises.
However, the fragmented nature of this response suggests
that it may be some time before the international community
develops a wholly satisfactory reply to Walzer's argument that
outside intervention in civil conflicts is doomed to failure.
Walzer presents a fully realized model of social evolution that
draws its force primarily from liberal political theory and only
secondarily from state practices that have, over time, coalesced
into international law. At particularly high or low ebbs in this
process of normative evolution, one may discern coherent the-
oretical arguments that can equal Walzer's views in their depth
and complexity. But these are isolated moments in a much
larger process of change. New crises will bring further change.
Proposals that the United Nations stand in loco parentis for so-
called "failed states"-those mired in seemingly endless con-
72. For this reason, states have been extremely reluctant to extend the
extensive protections for combatants and non-combatants contained in the
four Geneva Conventions to anti-government forces in civil conflicts. &e
Laura Lopez, Note, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Appling Intenwtional Hu-
manitarian Law to Intenal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L REV. (forthcoming
1995).
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flict and poverty-may seem attractive in some cases but not in
others. And the "lessons" supposedly learned from unsuccess-
ful interventions may be quickly unlearned in the face of par-
ticularly brutal struggles. Such inevitable wavering may not
provide an intellectually satisfying retort to Walzer, assuming
the international community does not come to embrace his
views. But this is perhaps for the best: in addressing civil wars
international law attempts to marshall institutions and princi-
ples that are removed in time, place, and conception from the
profoundly local issues giving rise to such conflicts. This
acute lack of "fit" between the problem and the solution calls
for a pragmatic and cautious approach.
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